We embed the behaviour of tax evasion into the standard two-dimensional Ising model. In the presence of an external magnetic field, the Ising model is able to generate the empirically observed effect of tax morale, i.e. the phenomenon that in some countries tax evasion is either rather high or low. The external magnetic field captures the agents' trust in governmental institutions. We also find that tax authorities may curb tax evasion via appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Our results are robust for the Barabási-Albert and Voronoi-Delaunay networks.
our tax evasion model can also replicate the effect of tax morale, if an external magnetic field is incorporated. By modifying the probabilities of evading or not evading tax duties, the external magnetic field captures agents' trust in governmental institutions. By implementing a positive and a negative external magnetic field and contrasting the resulting equilibrium levels of tax evasion with the baseline setting, where the external magnetic field is absent, we show that our model can explain both high and low levels of tax morale. To demonstrate that this remains valid regardless of the level of enforcement, we depict the equilibrium values of tax evasion corresponding to each considered external magnetic field for different levels of enforcement.
The remainder of our manuscript is organised as follows: in section 2 we briefly present our tax evasion model, which is based on the standard two-dimensional Ising model on a square lattice. In section 3, we discuss how the external magnetic field influences tax evasion. By varying the compliance level systematically and observing the resulting equilibrium levels of tax evasion for different external magnetic fields, we illustrate that the external magnetic field may be an appropriate tool which enables different degrees of tax morale to be modeled, for any level of compliance.
In section 4, we also embed our model into the Barabási-Albert network and the Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice. We find that the effect of the external magnetic field also remains valid in these networks. The last section presents a number of conclusions.
The model
We use the so-called single spin-flip heat-bath algorithm to simulate the Ising model on a 1000 × 1000 square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. In this algorithm, irrespective of the current state of the chosen spin, its new state is chosen with probabilities P ± = e −βE ± /(e −βE + + e −βE − ), where P ± are the probabilities of choosing the up (+) and down (−) states, respectively (Chowdhury and Stauffer, 2002) , and β is defined as 1/(k B · T ). The total energy (E) is given by the Hamilto-
As an external magnetic field we use h = 2B/k B T . A negative external magnetic field acts to augment the probability of becoming dishonest, whereas a positive field lowers this probability.
In our previous models we set B = 0, and hence neglect the influence of the external magnetic field. We interpret a negative external magnetic field (h < 0) as agents' low confidence in govenmental institutions, meaning that tax evasion is consequently high. On the other hand, a positive external magnetic field (h > 0) implies aboveaverage confidence in the tax authorities: since individuals feel well represented by the government, they feel more comfortable about paying their tax duty, and hence evade paying tax less frequently.
We interpret this setup in the following way: in every time period each lattice site is occupied by a tax payer who can either be honest (S i = +1) or a tax evader As an enforcement measure, we introduce a probability of an efficient audit (p).
If tax evasion is detected, the individual remains honest for a certain number of periods. We denote the period of time for which detected tax evaders remain honest by the variable k. We assume that k is a random number between either 0 and 10 or 0 and 50 periods. Both of these intervals, which we will use, express that agents are ashamed and feel guilty about their behaviour if cheating is detected, but that the shame is of temporary nature, which is typical for the normal type of shame (e.g. Potter-Efron and Efron (1993)). Obviously, the second interval allows detected agents to be more ashamed on average, having evaded taxes: agents have a longer memory of their wrongdoing.
One time unit is one sweep through the entire lattice. Audits are stochastically independent from other agents and from the history any agent has.
3 Dynamics of the model
In Figure 1 , the probability of an audit is set to 1% and the temperature to a level The left column of Figure 2 also implies a maximum duration of honesty of 10 periods, whereas the right column shows a maximum duration of honesty of 50 periods, after having been subject to an audit. We analyse for different strengths of group influence (by systematically lowering the temperature further below T c , we accord more importance to group influence) how the equilibrium levels of tax evasion evolve under different influences of the external magnetic field for different enforcement levels: we implement these by gradually augmenting the probability of an audit from 0 to 5% (in steps of 0.1 percent).
- Recall that a positive value of h stands for the case in which agents have great trust in governmental institutions and that a negative value of h stands for the case in which agents distrust governmental institutions. In this sense our model is able to replicate the phenomenon of tax morale.
Note that, if the external magnetic field is negative, an increase in the audit rate has the effect of reducing non-compliance substantially. Given that individuals are sufficiently affected in the case of detection (right-hand column of Figure 2 ) and group influence is sufficiently strong (panel on the bottom right), non-compliance may be reduced from about 100% to below 10% by increasing the audit rate to 5%.
Modifications
We now consider our model on other network structures to obtain further support for our results. In particular, we use the Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice and the Barabási-Albert network model. The Voronoi-Delaunay lattice (i.e. tessellation of the plane for a given set of points) is constructed as follows (Lima et al., 2000) .
First, a given number of points are randomly distributed in a plane of a given size.
For each point, the polygonal cell, consisting of the region of space nearer to that point than to any other point, must be determined. Whenever two such cells share an edge, they are considered to be neighbours. Using the Voronoi tessellation, the tax evasion can be reduced substantially, by increasing the audit rate to 5% (here we mean the amount of more compliance that can be established by implementing higher levels of enforcement). If a negative external field is applied, it can be seen, as in the other two networks, that tax evasion decreases with an increasing audit rate and that for any level of enforcement (i.e. audit rate) non-compliance is higher than for a zero or a positive external magnetic field.
For sufficiently small enforcement levels, we find for the applied negative external magnetic field (h = −0.5) that the equilibrium values in tax evasion are higher, the further the temperature is decreased. 1 This is most obvious for the square lattice with k ∈ [0, 10]: low enforcement levels (i.e small values of p) are less efficient to reduce tax evasion, the more individuals focus on what their neighbours do (i.e. for lower temperatures). In the presence of the negative external magnetic field, the number of honest agents is small for low enforcement levels. At lower temperatures honest agents (some agents become honest due to enforcement) have less influence on cheating agents to become honest, so that, compared to higher temperatures, tax evasion is higher for low enforcement levels. If enforcement levels increase, the tax evasion of more people is detected and these agents then usually become compliant for a while. If the number of agents is sufficiently large (due to a high level of enforcement), their influence on the non-compliant individuals grows. The lower the temperature is, the greater is their influence: non-compliance hence is smaller at lower temperatures, if enforcement is sufficiently high. This can be observed also in the Voronoi-Delaunay network for k ∈ [0, 10] and in the Barabási-Albert network
for lower values of k max , e.g. k max = 5.
Finally we briefly discuss why the non-compliance curve, which captures the influence of the negative external magnetic field (h = −0.5), declines more rapidly in the Barabási-Albert and in the Voronoi-Delaunay network, compared to the square lattice, when the audit rate is increased. We conjecture that this can be explained by the greater mean size of the neighbourhood in these two networks (on average, the neighbourhood comprises 6 agents in the Barabási-Albert network and 8 agents in the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice), compared to the square lattice (each agent has only 4 nearest neighbours). Setting the audit rate to a positive value forces some agents in the neighbourhood to become honest for k periods. The greater the size of the neighbourhood is, the more honest agents will be included in the considered agent's social network. These honest agents then exert influence on the respective individual to become honest, too. Hence, in the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice, which on average includes most agents in a neighbourhood, increasing the audit rate slightly has the effect of reducing non-compliance the most. In the Barabási-Albert network, whose neighbourhood is intermediate in size, the same increase of the audit rate consequently works less effectively to establish more compliance, compared to the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice, although it is still better than in the square lattice.
Conclusion
By incorporating the possibility of tax evasion into the Ising model we are able to replicate, within the context of a multi-agent-based model, the empirical fact regarding the existance of tax morale by isolating the effect of the external magnetic field on tax evasion. While in this study our focus is on the influence of the external magnetic field on tax evasion, other extensions to our simple model appear interesting and economically important. Allowing agents to differ in their period of honesty after detection seems to be just the first step in creating a more realistic tax evasion model. Economic variables, which are important for the decision regarding tax evasion, such as personal income, may need to be incorporated into the model.
Also, an intuitive extension to our hitherto very simple model may be to allow for a third type of agent, who is neither entirely compliant nor entirely non-compliant, but somewhere inbetween. 
